

eena

EUROPEAN EMERGENCY NUMBER ASSOCIATION



# 112 DAY

# RECOMMENDATIONS

FEBRUARY 2025

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# Introduction

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For 112 Day 2025, EENA has published a set of recommendations to further enhance emergency communications across the European Union. This report builds on the 2023 112 Recommendations Report, and provides recommendations in 14 areas of emergency communications and resilience.

Since 2023, there have been some significant developments in emergency communications, including increased implementation of life saving technologies such as mobile caller location and public warning. On the other hand, issues remain with continuous access to 112, while the number of false emergency calls remains stubbornly high.

This report will assess and provide recommendations on these recent developments. However before examining any specific recommendations, it would be beneficial to briefly reflect on the broader trends in emergency communications since 2023 which guided EENA when developing this report.

Perhaps the most important trend is the ongoing implementation of new EU laws for emergency communications by Member States, including those in Article 109 and 110 EECC, and in the European Accessibility Act. Although many Member States did not meet the implementation deadlines for Article 109 and 110 EECC, implementation has significantly improved since 2023, with all but three Member States having implemented mobile caller location, and all but seven having implemented public warning. However, recent events such as the 2024 Spanish floods showed that these new technologies should not only be implemented, but also accompanied by clear strategies for their effective use.

Another trend which this report considered is the ongoing 2G/3G switch off, and the transition of emergency communications to 4G/5G networks. The opportunities offered by this transition are being felt across the emergency communications supply chain, as PSAPs upgrade their systems to packet switched technologies, RTT becomes enabled for people with disabilities, and Next Generation eCall is prepared for deployment on EU roads. However, this transition also brings costs and risks, including potential interoperability issues on VoLTE connections, and the loss of access to 112 for vehicles equipped with legacy eCall.

There have been rapid advances in technology in recent years which could have transformative effects on emergency communications in Europe. As a result, the 2025 report contains two sections which were not included in 2023: Artificial Intelligence, and Emergency Satellite Communications. These technologies have not yet had a major impact on emergency communications, but could significantly improve public safety and access to 112 in the future.

Finally, the new European Commission and European Parliament brings both positive and negative political trends for emergency communications. There is a heightened focus on resilience in both institutions, with a Commissioner for Crisis Management and Preparedness being appointed, and the creation of the first European Parliament Intergroup on Resilience, Disaster Management and Civil Protection. On the other hand, the renewed focus on competitiveness has led to calls for the upcoming Digital Networks Act to reduce regulation for telecommunications providers. Without taking a position on the broader debate on deregulation, it is critical that emergency communications obligations in the EECC and EAA are preserved to avoid undermining public safety in Europe.

These trends show that the emergency communications landscape is ever changing, even as its core purpose, to improve public safety, remains the same. EENA's 112 Recommendations Report aims to help emergency services and policymakers take stock of these changes, and consider ways to further improve public safety and resilience across Europe.

The European Emergency Number Association (EENA) is an NGO which seeks to improve emergency communications in Europe. By using its network of over 1500 emergency services representatives, 200 academic researchers, and 100 solution providers, EENA acts as a platform and knowledge hub to develop policies to ensure that people facing emergencies get the best help possible.

## Continuous access to 112 is not always ensured

In the last few years, major national disruptions of access to emergency services have been reported in many European countries. Moreover, issues with the compatibility of VoLTE services have led to many Europeans being unable to access 911 in the United States.

The upcoming 2G and 3G shutdown could also result in older non-VoLTE capable devices losing the ability to contact 112, and will need to be tested to ensure that VoLTE capable devices can call 112 without issues in any circumstances. In this regard, the 2G and 3G shutdown must take place in an organised and coordinated manner in Europe to ensure that it does not create issues for accessing emergency services.

On a more positive note, recent developments in Direct to Device Satellite Communications could potentially improve access to 112 in the future, in particular by providing a fallback system for callers when the terrestrial network fails.



## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Member States ensure continual access to 112 by improving redundancy in their PSAP and telecoms infrastructure, and developing procedures to mitigate the impact of outages.
2. Member States utilise any new technological developments that could improve the resilience of 112, such as by investigating the use of satellite-based systems to provide a fallback service when terrestrial networks fail.
3. Member States, mobile network operators and the European Commission ensure that the 2G and 3G shutdown does not affect access to emergency services.

# Emergency satellite communications: significant advances for 112

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Smartphones are now capable of connecting with satellites in Low Earth Orbit to receive emergency communications and transmit public warnings to areas without a terrestrial cell connection. This technology was first approved for commercial use in the USA in November 2024, and will likely become available in the EU in the near future. One of the main initial uses of Direct to Device Communications is expected to be emergency communications, where it can bring connectivity to people in distress in remote areas.

The use of Direct to Device Satellite Communications will likely remain limited in the EU, due to the very high population coverage of terrestrial mobile networks. However, it may be useful for emergency communications in situations where the parts of the terrestrial network fail, such as following a natural disaster such as an earthquake. In these situations, satellites could be used to send public warnings to citizens, or to allow distressed citizens to make calls to 112. Direct to Device Satellite Communications can therefore significantly enhance the resilience of 112 in Europe.

The rise of satellite-based communications services also comes with several challenges for emergency communications. Perhaps the most important challenge to overcome is routing, which will have to work differently for Direct to Device. Other technologies, such as caller location, will also need to be tested to ensure they function effectively.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT


1. Member States investigate how Direct to Device could potentially improve emergency communications coverage, in particular by improving the resilience of 112.
2. Member States consider incorporating the Galileo early warning system, currently under development, into their public warning systems to improve their systems' resilience and reach.
3. The European Commission and Member States ensure that all emergency communications obligations, such as to route to the most appropriate PSAP, and to provide caller location, apply to providers of emergency satellite communications.

# Mobile caller location: big improvements but issues remain

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Mobile caller location has improved considerably over the past decade due to the introduction of Advanced Mobile Location (AML). This technology provides caller location with a typical accuracy of less than 50 metres, a significant improvement over Cell-ID, which provides a location within several kilometres. AML has now been implemented in 24 EU Member States and numerous other countries worldwide, and has been shown to halve emergency response times, saving lives, and improving efficiency for PSAPs. It also improves the accessibility of 112 for people with sight difficulties and intellectual difficulties, who may find it difficult to accurately describe their location. Despite these benefits, and despite caller location being a requirement of the EECC, this technology has not yet been implemented in Cyprus, Malta and Poland.

Eight years after AML's first use in the UK and Estonia, several improvements remain to be made. While network-based location was typically provided to PSAPs in more than 97% of emergency calls in 2023, some Member States received AML location in just 40% of calls. Considerable improvements also need to be made to ensure that roaming users such as tourists can avail of AML. As of 2023, despite 24 Member States having AML, just 8 Member States confirmed that location information was available for roaming end users.



To improve the accuracy of caller location and to assess the accuracy of the information transmitted to emergency services, Delegated Regulation 2023/444 required Member States to adopt criteria on the accuracy and reliability of caller location information by 5 March 2024. Despite this deadline, the European Commission's 2024 112 implementation report found that several countries have not adopted caller location criteria. In addition, BEREC noted in December 2024 that the Delegated Regulation provided insufficient guidance to Member States on what criteria they should use to assess the accuracy of caller location, and found inconsistency across the EU in setting these criteria. BEREC concluded that the European Commission should provide clearer guidelines for assessing caller location accuracy.

Despite the considerable added value of AML, accurate location information is only transmitted in about 50-80% of emergency communications. It is therefore necessary to consider other solutions for transmitting caller location where AML is not successful, such as network-based location.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Cyprus, Malta and Poland urgently implement handset-based caller location, as it is an almost cost-free technology that saves lives, and is a requirement of Article 109 EECC. The Commission should start infringement proceedings against these countries if they fail to do so.
2. Member States encourage all organisations in the emergency services chain (from PSAPs to first responders) to use handset-based location data to improve their operations. Member States should consider implementing the solution developed by Orange Belgium to enable AML over SMS while roaming, which has been successfully implemented in several countries for Android handsets.
3. Member States improve the accuracy of network-based location on fixed and mobile networks.
4. The European Commission provide clearer guidance on caller location by improving the criteria set out in Delegated Regulation 2023/444, and should play a more proactive role in coordinating the adoption of caller location criteria by Member States.
5. Until clearer Commission guidelines are developed, Member States consider following EENA's Recommendation for caller location criteria. This recommendation recommends setting a criteria of AML providing a location within 50 metres of the caller in at least 80% of emergency communications.

# Accessibility of 112 for people with disabilities

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Considerable improvements have been made in recent years to ensure that access to 112 is equivalent for all end-users.

The European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) replaced “emergency calls” with “emergency communications” which includes other forms of communication such as video and Real Time Text, while the European Accessibility Act (EAA) requires Member States to deploy Real Time Text by 2027. The Roaming Regulation also established that people should receive information on alternative means to access emergency services when visiting another Member States. Finally, Delegated Regulation EU 2023/444 supplementing the EECC provided specific criteria for an accessible solution to be considered as functionally equivalent to standard emergency communications.

Under the EAA, PSAPs will have to support and handle real time text or total conversation by 28 June 2025, or by derogation, by 28 June 2027. The 2024 European Commission Report on 112 received roadmaps from all but four EU Member States (Latvia, Luxembourg, France, and Hungary) on their transition to packet switched communications and expected capacity to receive RTT. All of the responding countries claimed that their PSAPs would be able to receive RTT before the end of 2027, with the majority expecting to have this capability by 2025 or 2026. It is less clear if mobile network authorities, who are required to ensure that their networks can support emergency communications using native RTT, will meet the 2025 or 2027 deadline for RTT.

Until RTT becomes mainstreamed, the accessible emergency communications services provided by Member States will continue to differ significantly. The European Commission’s 2024 Report on 112 found that the technology most deployed for people with disabilities is SMS, which ensures a two-way, text-based interaction between the person alerting the emergency services and the PSAP. SMS is available in 23 Member States and in Norway, though some of these systems require preregistration and don’t use the emergency number 112. Emergency applications are deployed in 17 Member States and Norway, with applications in the Netherlands and Malta also facilitating Real Time Text (RTT). The report concluded that most of these services did not meet the functional equivalence criteria listed in Delegated Regulation 2023/444, with many for example, not being free of charge, requiring pre-registration, or not functioning while roaming.

The availability of alternative means to contact 112 for people with disabilities remains fragmented among Member States, making it difficult for users to understand how they can contact 112 when travelling in other Member States. To improve this situation, following the adoption of the new Roaming Regulation, BEREC set up a database detailing the means of access to emergency services in each Member State; however, this database remains inconsistent and is rarely updated. Finally, certain mechanisms used by people with disabilities to contact 112 do not currently send the caller's location to PSAPs. Caller location has also been found to significantly improve response times for callers with sight or intellectual disabilities, who previously found it difficult to accurately describe their location.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Member States ensure that access to 112 for people with disabilities is equivalent to that enjoyed by other end-users.
2. Member States ensure that they can handle RTT and where available, total conversation communications by the legal deadline set by the European Accessibility Act deadline of June 2025, or by derogation, June 2027.
3. Member States ensure mobile network operators in their territory are ready to provide native RTT by the deadline established in the European Accessibility Act.
3. Member States ensure that all accessible features which they provide for contacting 112 can transmit caller location, while Poland, Cyprus and Malta should urgently implement caller location.
4. The European Commission ensure that RTT is natively present in all mobile phones and networks.
5. Standardisation organisations ensure accessibility standards for RTT are available for a reasonable period prior to the implementation deadline for RTT established in the European Accessibility Act.
6. Member States involve people with disabilities when introducing or removing accessible means to contact 112.
7. CAD-vendors ensure that their products are capable of handling RTT communications.

## Next Generation 112: More progress needed

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The transition to Next Generation 112 will bring considerable benefits to citizens and emergency services, including access to more valuable data, the possibility to use Real Time Text (RTT), video and pictures, and better interoperability between PSAPs. While there is no strict legal requirement for Member States to upgrade their PSAPs to next generation technologies, Member States are obliged to be capable of receiving RTT emergency communications by June 2025, or June 2027 at the latest, and will need to upgrade their PSAPs to packet switched technologies to receive these communications. In addition, legacy 2G and 3G networks are being shut down across the EU, necessitating a transition by PSAPs to receive packet switched based 4G and 5G communications.

Article 7 of Delegated Regulation EU 2023/444 requires Member States to provide a roadmap to the European Commission on their planned upgrades to packet switched technologies in PSAPs by the end of 2023. By the end of 2024, 23 Member States have provided these roadmaps to the Commission.

These roadmaps show that Member States now have concrete plans to migrate to packet switched communications, with the vast majority seeking to transition by mid-2026. Latvia, Luxembourg, France, and Hungary did not provide roadmaps, though Hungary reportedly transitioned in Q4 2024.

The 2024 Report claimed that 10 Member States have now migrated to packet switched 112, with an eleventh, Hungary, transitioning in Q4 2024. According to this table, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Malta, Sweden, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, and Slovakia have now transitioned.





The upcoming shut down of 2G and 3G networks will create challenges for PSAPs using circuit switch or packet switched technologies. The shutdown in Australia has left 2G and 3G capable handsets unable to contact emergency services, and there is a risk that a similar shutdown in Europe could result in users of 2G/3G capable devices losing connectivity without having sufficient notice to purchase newer, 4G and 5G capable devices.

To avoid any complications, the transition to packet switched emergency communications will therefore require end-to-end testing and deployment to validate compatibility and interoperability, and strong cooperation between public authorities and the telecommunications industry.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. France, Latvia, and Luxembourg provide roadmaps to the European Commission on their transition to packet switched technologies and RTT communications.
2. Member States and companies ensure that the deployment of packet switched emergency communications systems follows the standards in these areas, and is tested at all stages of the emergency services chain, to ensure compatibility and interoperability.
3. The European Commission set up a regular discussion platform with Member States and industry to align on deployment plans, interconnection of systems, and standards.
4. EU legislative and regulatory institutions explore how to interconnect different countries' emergency services IP networks in the future, allowing them to exchange calls and data in a secured manner.

## Public warning: better implementation required

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Article 110 EECC requires all Member States to implement public warning systems allowing authorities to alert every mobile phone user in a specific area of an ongoing disaster or imminent threat. Two technologies are used to implement mobile phone-based alerts: location-based SMS and cell broadcast. While the deadline to implement Article 110 was in June 2022, 7 countries (Ireland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Slovenia, Finland, Latvia, and Italy) have not yet implemented a fully operational mobile based public warning system using one of these technologies.

Authorities should go beyond the requirements of Article 110 to create a more effective, multi channel public warning system, to implement both cell broadcast and location-based SMS to ensure higher coverage. Member States should also consider the future use of space based public warnings, such as the Galileo emergency warning satellite service, to improve the resilience of their public warning systems, once these technologies are sufficiently developed.

The 2024 Niinistö report on Strengthening Europe's Civil and Military Preparedness and Readiness identified mobile public warning to be critical for empowering citizens during crises and in improving societal resilience. The report claimed that the most effective alert and crisis communications systems had several common characteristics, namely multi-channel distribution, effective geo targeting, clear and brief warning messages, and accessible features for people with disabilities. In addition to these features, the report noted that these systems were regularly tested, and accompanied by effective public education on public warning.

Some Member States such as Finland have considered using only mobile apps to alert people on their phones. While apps can represent a good complement to cell broadcast or location-based SMS, apps should not be considered as an equivalent alternative, as they do not ensure the same level of coverage and capacity to reach all end-users. In practice, where these apps have been implemented, they have been downloaded by no more than 30% of the local population, and are rarely downloaded by people visiting the country for short stays, such as tourists.

While there has been progress in implementing mobile based public warning in most EU Member States, recent tragedies such as the floods in Spain have underlined the importance of not only having an effective public warning technology, but to also have a clear strategy on the use of Public Warning systems. These strategies should include protocols on when to issue a public warning, what information that warning should contain, and a clear decision-making process for its activation

A final issue in the implementation of location-based SMS in some Member States has been the use of alphanumeric sender IDs in public warning SMS messages, which some countries have banned due to fraud risks. As a result of these bans, roaming users might not receive alphanumeric sender based public warnings, compromising their safety.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Member States ensure that a multi-channel, secure and operational Public Warning system allows authorities to warn everyone of a developing danger. Location-based SMS and/or Cell Broadcast should be one of the main channels but not the only ones.
2. Member States consider upgrading their current system with additional channels or enhancing the capabilities of their current system, such as by using geofencing and silent alerts in cell broadcast; or using the last known location database for greater situational awareness in location-based SMS.
3. Member States ensure that public warnings can be sent in several languages, and that the messages are accessible for people with disabilities.
4. Ireland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Slovenia, Finland, Latvia, and Italy implement a fully operational mobile based public warning system. The European Commission should take action against countries which do not implement public warning.
5. EU institutions play a more proactive role in promoting exchange of best practices around the usage and strategies of public warning systems.
6. Regulatory authorities ensure that the reception of location-based SMS is not prevented by the blocking of alphanumeric sender IDs.
7. Operating Systems developers and mobile network operators cooperate with Member States when upgrading their cell broadcast system.
8. Member States ensure there are clear protocols on when to issue a public warning, what information that warning should contain, and a clear decision-making process for its activation

## Mixed progress on out-of-hospital cardiac arrests

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Sudden Cardiac Arrest (SCA) accounts for around 20% of deaths in the European Union. This figure could be significantly lower if early chest compression and defibrillation was performed on all victims, with defibrillation in the first 3 minutes after SCA resulting in a survival rate of 74%. Despite this, less than 5% victims receive early chest compression and defibrillation in the first minutes after a SCA. Creating a digital registry so that people in need and emergency services can easily identify the nearest automated external defibrillators (AEDs) could significantly improve this figure. These registries would show the location of AED and necessary instructions to access them, such as the location of the AED in a given building, or the buildings opening hours, where appropriate.



While public and private initiatives to develop digital registries have been developed, these registries are not available in most EU countries. In addition, where these registries exist, they may be incomplete, while the wider public and PSAPs are often aware of their existence.

To improve the usability of these systems, Czechia, Denmark and France have services which alert emergency service professionals and other pre-registered people with first aid knowledge of nearby SCA victims and the location of the nearest AED. This allows them to provide early defibrillation and chest compression to the victim before the arrival of an ambulance. These programmes have been shown to substantially improve survival rates of out of hospital SCAs.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. National authorities develop digital registries of AEDs. Such registries should be available and promoted to all the population and easily show the location of the nearest publicly accessible defibrillators.
2. PSAPs include data from digital registries directly on their Geographic Information Systems.
3. Member States make sure that their population receives training on performing cardio-pulmonary resuscitation on victims of SCA;
4. Member States make sure that everyone is legally allowed to use AEDs;
5. Member States make sure AEDs are available in most crowded areas and areas with higher incident rates of cardiac arrests.
6. Emergency services develop citizens programmes to alert pre-registered users that are located next to the scene of an OHCA and instruct them to provide first aid to the victim before an ambulance arrives on scene.

## EU-level cooperation must improve

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EU level cooperation on emergency communications and disaster risk management remains underdeveloped, undermining public safety, and EU preparation and resilience. This is despite a [June 2024 Eurobarometer](#) finding that 79% of EU citizens want the EU to complement Member States when responding to major crises.

While emergency communications are partially regulated at an EU level, the organisation of emergency services remains a national competence. This split in competences can result in a lack of action to improve emergency communications, with national authorities waiting for EU institutions to take decisions, while EU institutions wait for Member States to do more.

In addition to causing decision making inertia, the lack of a stronger European platform for debate on emergency communications and disaster risk management has meant that critical lessons learned in one Member State are not being shared with others, leading to repeated, preventable failures, and losses in life.



In the absence of stronger coordination from the European Commission and Member States, Members of the European Parliament have established an intergroup on Resilience, Disaster Management, and Civil Protection. This new intergroup will serve as a forum for exchanges of views across political groups and will promote collaboration between MEPs and civil society. This dedicated space could significantly enhance awareness and foster effective risk management strategies throughout the EU.

The new European Commission has also expressed renewed interest in strengthening EU level resilience and coordination in emergency communications and disaster risk management. To improve this, the 2024 Niinistö report on Strengthening Europe's Civil and Military Preparedness and Readiness called for the EU to build a stronger culture of preparedness in policymaking.

The report recommended that common guidelines and protocols for disaster response be developed, and for crisis and emergency communications systems to be strengthened and regularly tested. To achieve this, it called for an EU Preparedness Law, which would set joint standards and long-term targets to align EU and national efforts, and streamline EU and Member State decision making and coordination. The report also recommended that a central operational crisis hub be established within the European Commission, and that regular EU Comprehensive Preparedness Exercises be held. These exercises would test high level decision making and cooperation across Member States, while also building links between public safety professionals.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Member States and the European Commission collaborate with and support the work of the new European Parliament Intergroup on Resilience, Disaster Management, and Civil Protection.
2. BEREC take a stronger role in making recommendations for emergency services. EENA believes that BEREC has sufficient competence to make recommendations in this area.
3. The European Commission implement key recommendations from the Niinistö report, including to develop an EU Preparedness law to set joint standards and long-term targets, align EU and national efforts, and streamline EU and Member State decision making, coordination and information sharing, and to establish a central operational crisis hub.
4. The European Commission organise regular EU Comprehensive Preparedness Exercises, to test high-level decision-making and operational coordination across Member States, and build strong links between actors and across sectors.
5. The European Commission and Member States hold regular workshops with public safety experts, to discuss best practices and improve cross EU cooperation. As part of these efforts, the European Commission should re-establish its Expert Group on Emergency Access
6. EENA documents such as the 112 Recommendation, and the recent Public Warning Report Card be used to facilitate exchanges of best practices on public safety.
7. Member States encourage their emergency services organisations to participate in EU projects which aim to improve cooperation in disaster risk management.

# Artificial Intelligence: opportunities and risks

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to improve public safety by improving PSAP processes and ensuring a higher overall quality of emergency services.

In 2024, EENA conducted a special project to assess possible uses of AI in emergency services. The project found that AI have considerable potential to improve processes in PSAPs, though some of the solutions trialed during the project would need further adjustments before deployment. A key recommendation was that AI solutions be designed for the specific needs of PSAPs, which include the requirement to be trained on lower quality audio, and higher data security. To achieve this, AI solutions may need to be trained on emergency communications data held by PSAPs, however this data, which includes recordings of emergency calls, can be highly sensitive.

Notwithstanding the potential value of AI for emergency services, its potential negative impacts on fundamental rights should not be ignored. Key risks associated with AI include the accidental creation of discrimination due to inadequate or non-representative data, or poorly designed algorithms. AI can also be used to obscure discrimination, with users hiding intentionally discriminative decisions such as racial profiling by claiming that the AI made the analysis, and not them. Finally, if AI solutions are used which are of a poor quality, they could reduce the quality of emergency services, risking the life and property of callers.



To help address these risks, uses of AI in the EU are governed by the AI Act. Annex III of this act lists uses of AI by emergency services as “High Risk”, with a recital to the Act explaining that this classification is because emergency communications professionals and first responders make critical decisions which impact the life and health of persons and their property. The key criteria for identifying a use of AI to be high risk under the AI Act is its potential adverse impact on fundamental rights, with risk being measured as a combination of the probability of an occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm.

Being classified as high risk under the AI Act does not prevent emergency services from using or experimenting with AI, but does create additional obligations for developers, users and other parts of the AI supply chain.

For example, high risk systems are obliged to implement a risk management system, to meet certain accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity criteria, and be used with human oversight. In addition, high risk AIs should have meet certain conformity standards described in the Act, and be used with a quality management system. Finally, certain uses require a "Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment" before deployment. All of these evaluations must take place before the high-risk AI is places on the market, and must continue throughout the life cycle of the product.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. AI users and developers ensure that their solution fully complies with the AI Act.
2. PSAPs share their experiences and best practices when experimenting with new AI solutions.
3. Developers consider unique concerns which PSAPs have, such as the need to protect sensitive data, or the need for on premise solutions for security reasons.

## Interoperability across Member States is needed

The EECC requires that a database of the E.164 numbers (traditional long phone numbers) of PSAPs in each Member State be maintained at an EU level. The purpose of this database is to allow PSAPs in a given country to alert a PSAP in another country of an incident taking place on its jurisdiction. For example, a PSAP in Ireland may receive a call from Ireland who is concerned about the safety of a relative living in Belgium.

This PSAP directory is currently managed by the European Communications Office (ECO). However, 7 EU countries (Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) are still not part of this directory. In addition, some countries which are participating in the database have not informed all of the PSAPs in their jurisdiction of the database's existence, undermining its value. Full participation by Member States in the PSAP Directory would be collectively beneficial for all Member States and their citizens, and could also stimulate future discussions on deeper cooperation in areas such as data sharing.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain urgently provide the ECO with a long number for the PSAP directory.
- 2.. Member States ensure that all PSAPs in their jurisdiction are aware of the PSAP directory and can use it when required.
3. The European Commission take action against Member States which do not participate in the PSAP directory.

# Next-Generation eCall: ensuring reliable next-generation service

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eCall is now available in more and more vehicles in the European Union. The European Commission's 2024 112 report found that Member States received 658,392 eCalls in 2023, 56% more than in 2021. Most emergency services are however concerned over the very high proportion of false calls, which can be detrimental to their operations.

While the use of eCall is growing rapidly, there is a risk that vehicle owners will lose access to this life saving service in the coming years as 2G and 3G networks are switched off across Europe. Delegated Regulation 2024/1084 requires Member States to ensure that PSAPs can receive Next Generation eCalls by 1 January 2026. However, currently deployed eCall modems are limited to 2G and 3G, while NGeCall which will use 4G and 5G, will only be mandatory for new vehicle models from 2026.

Notwithstanding the risks of the 2G and 3G network switch off for legacy eCall, NGeCall will create several new opportunities to improve quality of services for vehicle users. Vehicles will be able to send more information, more reliably and faster, while data will be capable of transmission to the PSAP without interfering with any conversation between the occupants of the vehicle, and the PSAP. Therefore, while EENA has some concerns over the impact of the switch off of legacy eCall, it is clear that NGeCall is a positive step which will improve public safety on EU roads. Furthermore, EENA is participating in the EU funded X\_HeERO project to help PSAPs across Europe to be fully equipped to handle Next Generation eCalls by 2026.

At the present time there is no clear solution to the situation facing vehicles equipped with legacy eCall. One means to reduce uncertainty over the 2G and 3G switch off would be for Member States to coordinate their efforts to switch off 2G and 3G networks, and to delay the switch off until a solution has been found for the issue. In addition, Member States and the European Commission can help speed up the transition to NGeCall by coordinating tests for the new technology and exchanging best practices for NGeCall.

The December 2024 BEREC [report](#) on the impact of market and technological developments on end user rights expressed concerns over the 2G and 3G switch off. The report stated that ensuring that devices and handsets which are 2G and 3G capable remain functional is critical to ensure continued access to emergency services. BEREC suggested that 2G and 3G networks should remain available for these devices until a reasonable period after the introduction, availability and use of new alternatives, such as NGeCall.

One challenge limiting the full functionality of eCall is the blocking of PSAP call-backs to vehicles in certain cases. Many vehicles use +882 and +883 numbers, which were historically blocked by networks due to past fraudulent use. While these vehicles can initiate emergency calls without issues, PSAPs often face difficulties calling back if the connection drops, as their systems or routing networks may block the call. To address this, EENA has tested call-backs across European PSAPs and urged both PSAPs and network operators to unblock these numbers for eCall use. EENA also advocates for reducing the high call fees associated with these numbers, as current rates are based on outdated satellite call pricing, not their role in emergency communications.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. PSAPs ensure that they are ready to receive NGeCall by the legally binding deadline of 1 January 2026, and should ensure that their system is sufficiently tested by that date.
2. Member States ensure that their PSAPs are ready to take advantage of the increased capabilities of NGeCall, such as additional data.
3. PSAPs who are not participating in the X\_HeERO project consider cooperating with the project as an external party.
4. European Commission coordinate testing on the transition to NGeCall;  
Member States should ensure that 2G or 3G networks remain operational until a solution is found for vehicles equipped with legacy eCall.
5. The European Commission and Member States ensure that vehicles equipped with legacy eCall systems retain access to 112 following the 2G/3G shutdown. If after-market solutions are considered, it is essential to ensure they are reliable and do not lead to an increase in false emergency calls.
6. The European Commission consider solutions to address the high number of false eCalls.
7. PSAPs and Mobile Network Operators should ensure that they do not block calls to +882 and +883 numbers which are currently registered for use by eCall providers.

## Many Member States still breaching EU legislation

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Key public safety legislation such as the European Electronic Communications Code remains unimplemented by the majority of EU Member States, undermining public safety and making it more difficult for many groups such as people with disabilities to access emergency communications.

The European Commission has an important role to play in ensuring that Member States are complying with EU law, by imposing fines or even taking them to the European Court of Justice in case of continued non-compliance. Unfortunately, in 2024, the European Court of Auditors found that DG CNECT, the European Commission Directorate General with the most responsibility for emergency communications, was the least effective DG for enforcing the implementation of EU law.



### EENA urges

1. Member States to comply with the European Electronic Communications Code and other emergency communications legislation.
2. The European Commission to monitor the implementation of the EECC and carry out infringement procedures against the countries that fail to fully implement the directive.

## False calls: persistent issues remain

The ratio of false calls to the total number of emergency calls still varies considerably among the Member States as of 2025. It is possible that this divergence is due to differences in the definition of false calls among Member States. To resolve this, the European Commission or BEREC could develop a harmonised definition, or guidelines for defining false calls which could be used in reports to the Commission.

A significant cause of false emergency calls is the poor design of emergency call features in smartphones and other devices. Features such as fall detection systems or emergency shortcuts can be accidentally triggered, resulting in "pocket calls" or unnecessary alerts that place an additional burden on PSAPs (Public Safety Answering Points). Without proper design and calibration, these devices can generate substantial numbers of false calls. To address these issues, it is essential for organisations developing emergency call or detection features to collaborate closely with PSAPs. By understanding the operational needs and user requirements of emergency services, these organisations can ensure that new features are both effective and do not exacerbate the challenge of false emergency calls.



## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Handset manufacturers, and manufacturers of smart devices with emergency features consider the needs of emergency services when designing phones and new safety features, to ensure their device does not accidentally trigger a significant increase in false calls.
2. The European Commission or BEREC harmonise or provide common guidelines for defining false calls.

# Recognition of the European emergency number is growing

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The European Commission's 112 Report in 2024 found that the number of emergency calls in Europe using the number 112 rose from 56% in 2019 to 62% in 2023.

112 is the single emergency number in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. Outside of these Member States, 112 is also available, but use varies by Member State, with 5% of emergency calls using the number 112 in Ireland, while 97% use 112 in Bulgaria.

The most recent available Eurobarometer report on 'Electronic Communications in the [European] Single Market' found that in 2021, while 74% EU citizens could identify '112' as a way to contact emergency services in their country, only 41% of them were aware that this number works for emergencies in other EU countries. This number was particularly low in Italy (19%), and Spain (22%). This figure needs to increase, as the added value of a common European number is not that people can dial 112 in their own country, but rather that people know they can dial 112 when they are anywhere in the EU.

## EENA RECOMMENDS THAT

1. Member States, the European Commission and national authorities launch awareness campaigns to promote the EU-wide availability of 112.
2. Airlines and other large organisations involved in tourism and business travel participate in campaigns to raise awareness of 112 as the European emergency number.
3. Member States and the European Commission take additional measures to promote the alternative ways for people with disabilities to contact emergency services in the country they are visiting.