Emergency calls in danger: The hidden risks of the 4G and 5G transition

During the 2026 EENA Conference, experts described the evolving and critical availability of emergency calls during the 4G/5G networks transition phase. 2G and 3G networks are being shut down following the shift towards 4G and 5G connectivity. This transition is problematic, as it has already revealed significant issues. The current risk is leaving many citizens without reliable networks to access emergency communications. Network operators should focus on both ensuring the proper functioning of newly implemented technologies and preventing misconfigurations that lead to connectivity loss for end-users.

Empirical evidence and lessons from Australia

A clear example of why network configuration must be carefully managed is seen in Australia, where a major outage demonstrated how hidden network failures can directly affect emergency calls.

In November 2023, Australia faced a major wake-up call when a network misconfiguration caused over 2,000 emergency calls to fail during a 12-hour outage. Even though mobile devices still showed a signal, they could not complete calls, revealing that networks can appear normal on the surface while hiding serious underlying faults.

The problem was linked to complex system architecture, poor configuration, and weak change management, with more than half of network outages affecting emergency calls. In response, the Australian government launched an independent testing programme, bringing together industry, universities and telecom operators through the Australian Control Test Facility.

Testing showed that while emergency calls normally connected in about 8 seconds, under stressed or hidden-failure conditions, this could rise to several minutes, and performance also varied by device. Some manufacturers fixed issues after they were identified.

The key lesson here is that normal reliability is not the same as crisis resilience. Ensuring robust emergency communications requires shared responsibility across governments, operators and device makers, supported by continuous testing to expose hidden vulnerabilities.

Australia’s experience highlights an important lesson: beyond isolated incidents, many countries now face wider technical and operational challenges as they move from 2G and 3G to 4G and 5G networks.

The transition from 2G/3G to 4G/5G is creating serious risks for emergency calls (112), as legacy and IP-based systems do not always work together properly.

Key issues include interoperability failures, routing and configuration errors, unreliable call delivery, and missing or delayed location data. Emergency callbacks are also not possible because there is simply no identifier to reach the person in distress (e.g., a telephone number). Work is ongoing to find a solution for callbacks.

Network operators highlight the need for early planning, strong device tracking, customer communication, and gradual network shutdowns. Their 2G/3G switch-off showed that many users’ devices relied on these networks for emergency calls, requiring mitigation measures such as device replacement.

Reliability measures during the 2G/3G sunset and NG112 transition in Romania

In Romania, 112 services showed that coordinated testing with mobile operators improves outcomes, increasing location accuracy from 50% to 75% after enabling VoLTE nationwide. The main takeaway is that safe network transition depends on early testing, cross-sector cooperation, and continuous monitoring to ensure emergency communications remain uninterrupted.

These transition challenges also raise a broader question about resilience: how can telecom networks reduce failures in the first place and recover more quickly when major disruptions occur?

Telecom networks in the IP era are increasingly vulnerable to large-scale failures, especially in emergency services like 112. Unlike older circuit-switched systems, modern IP networks rely on shared central functions for routing, naming, and authentication, meaning a single error can quickly cascade into nationwide outages and cut off emergency call access within minutes.

These failures are often driven by system complexity, cost-cutting, and human error, which is responsible for around two-thirds of incidents. Economic pressure and staff reductions are making resilience harder to maintain, even as networks become more complex with technologies like AI. As a result, emergency call failures can occur even when networks appear fully operational.

Case studies from the US, Australia and Pacific island countries highlighted a broader shift in how telecom resilience is assessed. Rather than relying only on hardware redundancy, resilience strategies increasingly examine processes and technologies across the full network lifecycle, including how failures are prevented, detected and contained. These experiences showed the value of structured and repeatable resilience assessments, particularly for the ‘sovereign functions’ underpinning emergency communications, instead of relying solely on subjective checks.

4G/5G transition’s effect on eCall

Beyond traditional voice emergency calls, this same need for resilience also applies to eCall systems, where the move to 4G and 5G is changing how vehicles automatically contact emergency services after a crash.

The transition from legacy 2G/3G systems to next-generation (NG) eCall on 4G/5G networks is becoming not only essential but also mandatory under EU Law, as older mobile networks are phased out. NG eCall is based on packet-switched technologies. eCall automatically contacts emergency services after a crash and transmits key vehicle and location data, but the system is increasingly at risk without proper upgrades.

The X_HeERO project supports the migration of PSAP technologies, enabling them to receive Next Generation eCalls. Additionally, the project covers improving data integration, addressing the needs of vulnerable road users and autonomous vehicles, and strengthening stakeholder cooperation. However, many PSAPs remain unready, partly due to delays from manufacturers and the lack of suitable vehicles and simple testing methods for real-world validation. In some countries, Mobile Network Operators are not ready yet.

Standardisation bodies such as CEN will work on updating the Minimum Set of Data to enhance the information sent to the PSAP (e.g., vehicle identification, location, and crash information), while also addressing issues such as false alerts. While standards provide the framework, effective deployment depends on close collaboration with vehicle manufacturers and other partners. Within the CEN, there is a Technical Committee called TC 278 “intelligent transport systems”, within which the working group WG 15 is actively working on eCall.

The Czech Republic’s experience with NG eCall showed that migration requires extensive testing, fallback mechanisms, and continuous simulation. Across all contributions, the key message is that reliable NG eCall depends on strong coordination between PSAPs, mobile operators and the automotive industry, supported by thorough testing without assumptions.